Lebanon’s Fragile Food Security System and the Prospect of a Broader War With Israel

Farmer Hussein Shaheen harvests olives near the southern Lebanese town of Hasbaya near the border with Israel on October 29, 2023. (Photo by JOSEPH EID/AFP via Getty Images) Development & Economy Security & Conflict Lebanon Lebanon’s Fragile Food Security System and the Prospect of a Broader War With Israel Lebanon’s struggling agriculture sector is not equipped to fill the gap in food shortages should the need arise. Zeead Yaghi July 17, 2024 July 17, 2024 The saber rattling between Hezbollah and Israeli officials during the past few weeks, has everyone in Lebanon predictably worried that Israel’s systematic destruction of the southern parts of the country will expand to regions beyond Hezbollah’s area of operations. We will not have to imagine the type of devastation that a new Israeli war on Lebanon would bring. Anyone currently residing in Lebanon born prior to 2006 has lived through one Israeli war on the country, a large section of the population have lived through two, including two decades of occupation and a devastating siege of Beirut where the modern Israel Defense Forces (IDF) first developed its methods of population war. We also have a daily live feed of Israel’s onslaught on Gaza. Israel’s campaign against the Gaza Strip and its residents has last lasted nine months now, killing almost 40,000 people though recent estimates suggest the number could be as high as 186,000 people or 5 percent of the Palestinian population of the strip. Ever since Hezbollah and other military groups operating out of South Lebanon began engaging with the Israeli military in the aftermath of October 7, IDF officers, Knesset MPs, and Israeli officials keep promising to turn Beirut (and all of Lebanon) into another Gaza. Though Lebanon is dealing with the fear of having an all-out war, its elite had already set the country decades back in the past few years Though Lebanon is dealing with the fear of having an all-out war, its elite had already set the country decades back in the past few years. Lest we forget that Lebanon is already reeling from a series of crises manufactured by the current political establishment. The country’s leaders have enacted policies that have wiped out the population’s savings, plunging it into a financial crisis which the World Bank described as the “most severe crises episodes globally since the mid-nineteenth century.” Years of mismanagement, theft, and negligence led to the Beirut Port explosion in 2020, which killed hundreds, maimed thousands, and invited real estate vultures to speculate and displace the residents of devastated neighborhoods. Lebanon’s state, institutions, and civil society groups are the least capable in their current form to manage the series of emergencies and stressors that would befall the country’s various economic sectors should an Israeli open war be launched. The most fragile of these sectors is the country’s food security and the beleaguered agriculture sector attached to it. Today Lebanon imports 80 percent of food products consumed in the country, while the local agriculture sector provides a measly portion of the internal market. A Mercy Corps report indicated that the country’s import-to-GDP ratio rose to 90 percent in 2022. While today the floating Lebanese pound has stabilized around 89,000 Lebanese pounds per dollar, even in the midst of severe currency fluctuation two years ago, food imports increased by 22 percent. The state requires two things to maintain this import dependency: hard currency and transit ports. An Israeli invasion is bound to destroy the latter and destabilize the former The state requires two things to maintain this import dependency: hard currency and transit ports. An Israeli invasion is bound to destroy the latter and destabilize the former. During previous Israeli incursions on Lebanon, the country’s airport and port facilities were targeted first, trapping citizens inside the country and preventing aid from accessing it via sea or air. Such a turn of events would unravel a very cash heavy economy and would upend any attempts at stabilizing the currency the current central bank leadership has put in place. This situation would bring back the horrors of the early days of the economic crises: gas queues, hourly changes to the exchange rates, price gouging, and the emergence of a black market for every consumable. The country’s limping agriculture sector is not equipped to fill the gap in food shortages should the need arise. The agriculture sector, regions, and producers are besieged by various factors: excessive heat and fires have devastated plenty of land in rural Akkar, while producers in the northern district’s plains are relying on sewage water for irrigation. All the while the Israeli military have enacted an environmental catastrophe akin to an ecocide since the launch of military attacks in October. The IDF have destroyed large swaths of agricultural land in southern Lebanon, the main economic sector of the region. The wide use of internationally sanctioned ammunition such as white phosphorus has effectively poisoned hundreds of acres which will need years of careful treatment and investment to make them in any way usable again. The Israeli air campaign also reached Beqaa in the east, particularly the outskirts of Baalbek, the agricultural heart of the country, severely restricting the activities of producers and farmers. Between threatening to cut Lebanon from the rest of the world and a military campaign with devastating ecological consequences and several environmental stressors, another Israeli invasion threatens Lebanon’s people’s ability to feed themselves and a destruction of the country’s barely functional food security establishment. History of Lebanon’s agriculture policy Lebanon’s agriculture failings and import-dependent food system are byproducts of decades of state policy which engineered the agriculture sector to provide almost exclusively for the external market at the behest of a few powerful state-backed traders who dominated the food industry. This marriage between the state and powerful traders was really established in the mid-1960s during the Shehab era. At the time the Lebanese state enacted major agricultural development schemes spending millions in order to modernize and revolutionize production and attempt to compete with agricultural powerhouses such as Egypt and France at the time. The Shehabist intervention to farmers at the time—cheap agricultural credit, free distribution of seeds, tractors, and experts—was built on the condition that local producers grow what the state demanded. This decision was made by powerful state-backed traders who ultimately decided which produce would be supported. This is the origin story of the symbiotic relationship in Lebanon between the state, traders, and farmers. In the 1960s, state planners from the ministries of public planning and agriculture, and foreign experts from the United Nations and others endorsed this scheme as many strongly believed that Lebanon was capable of becoming an agriculture powerhouse should the proper investment and management of the countryside be established. The state in the 1960s understood the agricultural sector as the nation’s guarantor, its safety valve. For decades thus, the state would subsidize certain cash products, local traders would then buy the produce on the cheap then export abroad while they imported the majority of the country’s food needs. This system persists to this day even though the actors have changed over time and even though the volume and depth of state support has waned since the Shehabist days. Many experts held the same beliefs before the 1960s and many currently continue to believe so. Whether it was Ottoman or French planners at the turn of the 20th century, the American University of Beirut’s agricultural scientists working in the Beqaa during the mandate period, to more recent Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Food Program (WFP) experts employed by the state from during the Shehab era to this day. The way the Lebanese agriculture sector and food security system function today depends on a collaborative process between the state, foreign experts, and powerful food traders The way the Lebanese agriculture sector and food security system function today depends on a collaborative process between the state, foreign experts, and powerful food traders. The state grants exclusive rights for traders to import certain foods, and subsidizes the local agriculture to ship out products for the outside market at the behest of these same traders. All the while international institutions support the state’s program by providing technical expertise and enhancements to local farmers. Take a road trip through the Beqaa and you will see its plains littered with USAID, FAO, or UN signs reminding passersby of their donations and support in maintaining the Lebanese agricultural sector. Yet the agriculture sector, as engineered, does not provide for the country’s population. Any economic shock, be it currency fluctuations, lack of liquidity, or credit crunches makes the price of imported food products extremely volatile. During the height of Lebanon’s currency collapse, you could easily visit a supermarket during the day and buy groceries at a certain price and then later visit the same supermarket in the evening to find the same products at a different price. This is not sustainable, and an all-out war would make it much worse. Shifting production toward the local market and devolution The time has come that pressure is placed on local Lebanese officials and foreign funders responsible for maintaining the agriculture sector to ditch the export dependency model, pursue food security independence, and open-up the local market to local farmers. Today, these farmers face capital and bureaucratic hurdles which prevent them from accessing and competing on the local market. The shelves and aisles of major supermarket chains and local produce sellers are made of 80 percent foreign goods. Shifting toward a system that prioritizes the local market will break the grip of the food import cartel on the agriculture sector, boost the prospects of local producers, encourage local investments, and provide for whoever else is left in the sector with a dignified living. The agriculture sector is not the guarantor of the country’s economic prosperity, despite what Lebanese politicians across the political and sectarian divide have been saying since time immemorial The agriculture sector is not the guarantor of the country’s economic prosperity, despite what Lebanese politicians across the political and sectarian divide have been saying since time immemorial. That does not mean it has to be run the way it has been for the past 60 years. The country’s agricultural capacity can provide for those living in it, it can help relieve Lebanon’s dependence on foreign imports, and be a guarantor for the nation’s food security in case of regional flare ups. The matter does not require the sort of 1960s style large scale state intervention, least of all by the sectarian state that we have today and its monopolists. It would empower local stakeholders in rural regions in having a say in the country’s politics. It could also provide a template for the country’s lagging opposition and civil society actors to begin to properly envision a sort of politics capable of challenging the centralized sectarian status quo in Beirut. Lastly, having a robust food security system would shield Lebanon from the tremors and travails of geopolitical fallout in the region. Since the country’s founding, Lebanon has found itself directly or indirectly involved in major political ruptures. A food security system that relies less on imports, is self-sustaining, and self-sufficient would help the country and its people stem the consequences that war or even the prospect of war might bring. Zeead Yaghi is a Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on governance, politics, and economy in Lebanon. He is also the institute’s second Mohamed Aboelgheit Fellow, and holds a PhD in Modern Middle East History from the University of California San Diego. READ NEXT Development & Economy Tunisia January 1, 1970 Power Cuts, Protests, and (Lack of) Policy: Tunisia’s Economy Under Pressure July 30, 2026 These past few months, Tunisians have been protesting the country’s worsening socioeconomic conditions and living standards.… by Sahar Mechmech July 30, 2026 by Sahar Mechmech July 30, 2026 Security & Conflict Governance & Politics Lebanon January 1, 1970 What Does the Trilateral Framework Mean for Lebanon? 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